In this paper, we study the French dilemma associated to court administered resolution of corporate financial distresses: bankruptcy courts have to combine both social efficiency (maintaining employment) and ex post financial efficiency (determining the best issue for financial distress, proxied here by the global recovery rate). We empirically discuss the importance of this dilemma through a large sample of decisions of French commercial courts concerning the future of bankrupt firms (reorganization, sale as a going concern and liquidation). We test also this particularity when we discuss the determinants of bankruptcy courts' selection between rival offers in sales as a going concern. Finally, we evaluate the financial cost of this well-known pro debtor model through the recovery rates of various claimants. Our main results are: (1) French commercial actively work to protect employment by facilitating continuation and reducing domino effects of bankruptcy. (2) the courts' choice between rival buyout offers confirm that social considerations prevails in the arbitration of bankruptcy courts. (3) Continuations through reorganization plans generate the highest recovery rates for all classes of creditors. (4) Contrary to the expected trade-off between social and financial efficiency, courts also engage measures to increase debt recoveries once continuation tends to be the selected issue. However, for sales, recovery rates are inhibited by asset illiquidity and/or by the courts' attempt to promote firm's continuation through sales at a low price.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the works of Bebchuck (1988) , Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) 5 , the theoretical literature on bankruptcy law largely explored a twofold focus in the nineties. First, is bankruptcy process ex post efficient or maximizing the post bankruptcy value of the firm to share between all claimants? Second, is bankruptcy law ex ante efficient or does it provide for all stakeholders to have the right incentives (credit rationing (Longhofer (1998) , Povel (1999) ), over-investment (Gertner, Scharfstein (1991) , Eberhart and Senbet (1993) , Longhofer and Carlstrom (1995) ), monitoring (Cornelli and Felli (1997) ), managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk and Picker (1996) ),…). At present, empirical studies dealing with bankruptcy practices in US and European countries are booming and the recent Doing Business reports 6 prompt many scholars to study the effects of their national bankruptcy code: the shutdown/continuation decision of US commercial courts (Morrison (2007) ), the recovery rates and the way banks react to the differences in creditor's legal protections between UK, Germany and France (Davydenko and Franks (2007) ), the evaluation of secured creditor priority violation in Chapter 11 (Weiss and Capkun (2007) ), the impact of regional political characteristics on Russian judicial decisions about the number and the types of bankruptcies (Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2006)) or, the duration and the costs associated to the Swedish auction bankruptcy system relative to the US reorganization procedure (Thorburn (2000) ).
These researches are of prime interest because all industrial economics tend to remove or adjust their corporate reorganization procedure in order to make them quicker and more efficient at a lower cost. But their objective differs. As ones promote liquidation in order to ensure larger recovery rates for secured creditors and prevent any competition distortions in favour of financially distressed firms, others seek to develop the rival issue (continuation) to generate some economic value within the bankrupt firm or to maintain employment. Recent works supervised by the World Bank, classifying countries according to their level of secured creditor's legal protection and the characteristics of their bankruptcy legislation, suit these large differences across European countries 7 . It appears various levels of both stakeholders' protection (pro creditor vs. pro debtor systems) and court interventionism (private or out-of-court system vs. court administered procedures). For instance, U.K. bankruptcy rules ensure secured creditors (especially those with floating charge) to sell the bankrupt firm's assets to cancel their debts whatever the procedure engaged: reorganization or liquidation. In the German system, the floating charge does not exist, but secured creditors (as in U.K. system) may veto reorganization plans, allowing them to partially control the restructuring process.
Even if court administered reorganization and liquidation procedures perform also in previous countries, French ones differ in the sense that they are the most pro debtors ones. As a consequence, France currently faces to the following comments or critics. First, French law is explicitly intended to save bankrupt firms in order to protect employment. First article of 1985 bankruptcy code thus orders the various objectives of the law: "safeguarding the business, 5 See Hart (2000) for a review of literature on the basic papers dealing with economic analysis of bankruptcy law. 6 These reports, edited by the World Bank, involve empirical measures of bankruptcy law, securities law and law enforcement. 7 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) largely developed this approach that combines Law and Finance. maintaining the firm's operations and discharging liabilities" 8 . Second, French bankruptcy process exhibits a major paradox: nearly 90% of French bankruptcy filings end up in liquidations 9 whereas the bankruptcy code promotes the rival issue: continuation (still this figure is comparable to the U.K. case, where 90% of bankrupt firms disappear through liquidation).
In this paper, we explore a large sample of bankruptcies to evaluate the outcomes of French bankruptcy law, which may serve as a benchmark to discuss the relative merits/drawbacks of such a pro debtor model. More precisely, our first purpose is to test whether the first article of bankruptcy law crucially influences the commercial courts' activities as liquidation, reorganization and sale as a going concern of bankrupt firms are totally controlled by the court. At this time, we argue that French commercial courts have to deal with a particular dilemma, i.e. explicitly arbitrate between financial efficiency (choosing the issue which maximizes the value of assets or reducing type 1 and type 2 errors during the bankruptcy process 10 ) and social efficiency (maintaining employment through bankrupt firm's continuation). Indeed, we may identify among economists and lawyers a consensus on the fact that pro debtor bankruptcy codes are more likely to allow economically inefficient firms to reorganize whereas pro creditor bankruptcy models may probably prevent economically efficient firms to run their operations as they promote liquidation. The second purpose of the paper is to evaluate the financial efficiency of the French bankruptcy process through global recovery rates for various outcomes. Here, the crucial question is whether the work of commercial courts depicted in the previous part, i.e. the court administered rescue of failing companies (in order to preserve employment), has a cost. In other words, does such a pro debtor system significantly reduce the proceeds to share between all claimants in continuation cases? And what are the differences among the various legal outcomes of bankruptcy? Our main findings can be summarized as follows.
In a first time, when we analyse Courts' decision making on the final issue of bankruptcy, it appears that French commercial Courts do work to promote continuation in order to improve social efficiency. Indeed, continuation remains the best way to preserve employment and to reduce the occurrence of domino effects: suppliers or trade creditors, who are often junior or unsecured claimants, are thrown into financial distress due to the bankruptcy of their partners. From the same perspective, we give empirical evidence that the protection of employment serves as a guide to discriminate between rival offers in case of sales as a going concern. More importantly, we show that Courts operate under severe external constraints (the financial and economic characteristics of bankrupt firms) that the development of prevention, developed through the legal reform of 1994, allowed to reduce. In a second time, we show, contrary to the common wisdom on such a debtor friendly system, that this particular orientation of bankruptcy law does not imply a severe cost for stakeholders, especially in reorganization cases. This conclusion is however not valid for sales as a going concern as both liquidations and sales as a going concern generate similar levels of debt recoveries. Finally, for continuation and liquidation 8 Weber (2005) explores the effects of this French legal particularity on agency problems between bankrupt firms their debtholders. He argues that French firms have few incentives to file for bankruptcy due to a court administered process (stakeholders have no role in the bankruptcy process) and the civil and criminal sanctions associated to the bankruptcy. 9 Source: Domens (2007) . 10 Type 1 errors occur when some economically inefficient failing firms mistakenly are categorized as efficient and allowed to reorganize. Type 2 errors occur when economically efficient but failing firms liquidate whereas it would generate higher value if they would reorganize.
cases separately, we highlight the factors which have an impact on global recovery rates, wondering if Courts seek also to raise debt recoveries, especially when reorganization tends to be the final issue.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature on empirical studies dealing with bankruptcy legislations. Section 3 summarizes the French bankruptcy code. Section 4 describes the dataset and offers summary statistics. Section 5 gives the first empirical evidence of the French dilemma with models of determinants of French commercial courts' decisions about both the outcome of financial distress (reorganization, sale as a going concern or liquidation), and the choice between rival offers in case of sales as a going concern. Section 6 examines the consequences or the costs of the French system through both the levels and the determinants of global recovery rates for each issue of the bankruptcy process. Section 7 concludes.
II. THE RELATED LITERATURE
Our paper may be linked to various areas of research in economic analysis of bankruptcy law. The first topic concerns the criteria of commercial courts' choices between the rival issues to financial distress. By this way, empirical research tends to understand the discrepancy between the written law and the procedures as they are enforced: for small firms under Chapter 11 procedure, Morrison (2007) demonstrates that US commercial courts rarely allow failing firms to stay under their protection whereas their liquidation would be optimal.
11 Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2006) prove, on firm level database, that Russian commercial courts are largely dependent on regional governors which try to keep some of control over assets of financially distressed firms 12 . We can also rely our strand of research to some new behavioural law and economics papers which focus on the perception bias of judges. Marinescu (2007) demonstrates that judges' decisions concerning unfair dismissals are influenced by the labour market conditions (unemployment rate) or the macro economic context 13 . Rachlinski, Guthrie and Wistrich (2007) ask whether specialized judges, here bankruptcy judges, make better decisions than judges who are generalists. Precisely, they test specialized judges' capacity to resist to the influence of common heuristics when they make their decisions. Their main result is that they are vulnerable too, when compared to non specialized judges.
The second focus of the empirical literature on corporate bankruptcy concerns duration, cost and creditors' recovery rates for various ways to resolve financial distress. In this area of research, the most studied feature of bankruptcy law is the violation of absolute priority rule (A.P.R.) in US reorganization process (Chapter 11). This deviation means that senior claims, such as secured creditors' ones, are not fully satisfied before junior creditors, especially equity holders, receive any payment 14 . Recently, Weiss and Capkun (2007) showed that the last changes in commercial 11 Morrison (2007) gives also very useful statistics on durations and costs of the US legal reorganization process which serve us to compare with French bankruptcy process as the two samples are quite similar. 12 For other reasons than political strategy, Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006) test the impact of 1997 Belgian bankruptcy code reform on bankruptcy rates. 13 Here, the bankruptcy rate (and also the unemployment rate) serves as a proxy to measure the economic conditions in which firms perform. 14 With such a tool, we may evaluate the ability of junior claimants to influence the reorganization process.
courts' practice and the strengthening of secured creditor's rights in US bankruptcy law may explain why violations of A.P.R. decrease in comparison to results obtained in papers focused on prior periods (Franks and Torous (1989) , Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990) , Weiss (1990) and Betker (1995) ). They prove also that bankruptcy costs increased on the period 1993-2004 due to a longer reorganization process (the length of U.S. reorganization process has a mean of 465 days 15 ). Another way to violate the A.P.R. described above is the debtor-in-possession financing which provides a super-priority status to post filing loans in order to encourage lenders to extend additional loans needed for continuation. Dahiya, John, Pury and Ramirez (2003) empirically demonstrate that the over-investment problem (the theoretical expected effect of this post filing financing) is not severe in practice. Moreover, these loans allow bankrupt firms to emerge quicker and more successfully from the reorganization process.
Another related topic is the ability of private solutions to resolve financial distress. The best suited mechanism to determine and to share the right (or highest) value of the bankrupt firm's assets is an auction (Bebchuck (1988) ). Once the firm filed for bankruptcy, an automatic stay on creditors' claims prevents them from dismantling assets before a sale may be undertaken. According to the highest bidder (which largely depends on the demand side conditions rather than the court's decision), the financially distressed firm is either sold as a going concern or piecemeal liquidated allowing assets to move to their best use in the future. In Sweden, all bankrupt firms are turned over to a court-appointed official who organizes an open cash-only auction to arbitrate between a continuation sale or a piecemeal liquidation. This legal particularity has been largely studied by Thorburn (2000) and Strömberg (2000) in order to shed light on merits of the auction relative to the classical reorganization process. On the one side, Thorburn (2000) presents empirical evidence that auctions are speedy (on average two months), have low direct bankruptcy costs, and exhibit similar levels of recovery rate in comparison to those reported by Franks and Torous (1994) for a sample of Chapter 11 cases 16 . On the other side, Strömberg (2000) demonstrates that Swedish cash auctions, as compared to reorganizations, are immune to conflicts of interest between claimants, and that continuation, through a sale of the assets to incumbent manager, is a common issue to resolve financial distress. However, as expected, such a pro-creditor bankruptcy system leads to inefficient liquidations 17 .
Finally, Davydenko and Franks (2007) explore, for the first time in a cross country analysis including U.K., Germany and France, the expected effects of national bankruptcy codes on the bank debt contracts (size of the loan, level and type of collateral, and interest rate). Using, as in our case 18 , a sample of small and medium sized bankrupt firms, they find evidence that large differences in banks' legal rights across these countries correlate with significant differences in banking strategies and outcomes. In particular, French banks have a Coasian approach of their 15 We do note use their results on recovery rates for various stakeholders because they test a sample of firms with assets in excess of US 100 millions in order to highlight deviations in favour of equity holders. 16 Eckbo and Thorburn (2007) recently study the problem of fire sale auctions and demonstrate that this phenomenon appears in piecemeal liquidation and not in sales as in a going concern. They also study the variables which influence the bid price. 17 In particular, these inefficient liquidations are frequently avoided through sale-backs (id est. sales of assets to the incumbent managers) when markets are illiquid. Market illiquidity means that industry indebtedness is high and the firm has few non specific assets. 18 In our paper, we focus rather on global recovery rates (including all stakeholders) in order to evaluate ex post efficiency of the overall bankruptcy process. national pro debtor bankruptcy code. They require more collateral than lenders in UK or Germany. They rely also on special collateral forms which minimize the risk of dilution during the court administered bankruptcy process. Finally, the authors demonstrate that bank recovery rates remain inferior in France due to the lack of creditor protection, France being ranked third in this sample. The strength of this approach is to include both bankruptcies and informal renegotiations. Yet, the obtained results restrict to bankers' claims only. This review of recent empirical studies reveals that, contrary to our analysis, no previous studies have looked so closely at the determinants of commercial courts decisions between the rival outcomes of corporate financial distress. Indeed, we originally oppose both pre-default variables (such as measures of financial distress, economic value of assets, or causes of default) to postdefault variables (such as the measures engaged by the court) in order to better understand the factors which statistically have an impact on the future of bankrupt firms. We explore also, for the first time, how such a court administered process may discriminate between rival offers in case of sales as a going concern. Moreover, we take into account in the present paper both financial and social efficiencies of bankruptcy law to study to what extent the law may, at the same time, promote continuation in order to preserve employment, and protect the interests of all other claimants. The following analysis should also be viewed as an exhaustive evaluation of recovery rates for all classes of creditors whereas previous studies dealt with fewer classes of creditors, sometimes with only secured banks. Finally, our large dataset on the period 1984-2005 allows us to highlight the impact of the 1994 legal reform (that we interpret as the development of prevention among financially distressed firms) on both courts' decision making and financial efficiency of bankruptcy law through the global recoveries.
III. FRENCH BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
Since bankruptcy law reforms of 01/25/1985 and 06/10/1994, French collective system exhibit two complementary court administered procedures. The first one aims at continuing business through either a reorganization plan or a sale as a going concern ("redressement judiciaire"). The second one is a classical liquidation procedure of firm's assets ("liquidation"). In the shadow of this process, there exists also an out-of-court settlement ("règlement amiable") in which the manager, with the help of an officer appointed by the bankruptcy judge, negotiate with some of its claimants the payment of its debts. In order to reach successfully an arrangement, this procedure is not public (all creditors are not informed that the financially distressed firm negotiates with some of its claimants 19 ) and allows the bankruptcy judge to ask for a stay of creditors' claims (in this case, the procedure becomes public). In January 2006, French bankruptcy law has been removed in order to make easier bankruptcy filings. Now, they may be initiated voluntarily by managers, creditors or the Court even if the financially distressed firm is not "en cessation des paiements". Indeed, in previous bankruptcy system, all financially distressed firms had to be largely unable to pay debts as they come due to file for bankruptcy. Since 2006, all firms which face the possibility of being bankrupt in the future may initiate a bankruptcy filing 20 . However, as there are no sufficient data to cover the last reform of bankruptcy law, we focus on the period 1985-2005 and keep its analysis for further research: at present time, the new legislation is too recent for having numerous closed files. Moreover, in all regressions and descriptive statistics (cf. sections IV to VI), we split our bankruptcy cases in two sub-samples (1989-1994 and 1994-2005) in order to take into account the reform of bankruptcy law in 1994, and to evaluate the impact of this change on our results. Precisely, the main legal innovations in 1994 are: 1) the change in absolute priority rule in case of liquidation (secured creditors are now paid down before creditors which offer credit after firms file for bankruptcy), 2) the judge may pursue agents who buy bankrupt firms in order to sale them piecemeal once bankruptcy process is closed and, 3) the judge can immediately liquidate financially distressed firms if he considers that there is no chance to continue their operations under the protection of the law (this procedure was soon in practice before 1994 but it was not written in the law). However, we consider, with bankruptcy professionals, that these changes in the law written did not crucially remove the practice of commercial courts once the firm filed for bankruptcy, except for the modification in absolute priority rule in liquidation cases. More importantly, we expect that firms, which filed for bankruptcy post the 1994 bankruptcy reform, are more likely to be worth saving because commercial courts promote more prevention among financially distressed firms of the second sample (for instance, via the alert procedure 21 ). In other words, it is the unique legal difference that we consider (and test) between our two samples of bankrupt firms. On the period 1985-2005 studied in this paper, the bankruptcy process is organized as follows.
A. The liquidation
The liquidation process is quite simple. Once the court ordered the liquidation, either as soon as the firm filed for bankruptcy ("liquidation immediate"), or when the bankruptcy judge estimates that there is no chance to continue firm's operations after an observation period 22 ("liquidation"), the commercial court appoints an official who liquidates all firm's assets to clear debt in an ordered manner. The proceeds are then distributed in the following order: the most recent salaries are paid first (super privilege), following by administrative expenses of the collective procedure, other salaries and claims of tax authorities (privilege). Then, the liquidator cancels secured debts which are ranked before the post default creditors 23 (protected by article 40 of French bankruptcy law). The remainder goes to junior claimants.
B. The continuation
When the commercial court estimates that there is a chance for the firm to reorganize or to be sold as a going concern, the firm can file for bankruptcy. At this time, the judge stops all 20 As the earlier firms file for bankruptcy, the less financially distressed they are, both reorganization rates and recovery rates should increase. 21 The bankruptcy court may, via the alert procedure, force a company to develop some economic or financial measures in order to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. The court may also propose the firm to file for an out-of-court settlement such as the "règlement amiable". 22 The objective of the observation period is to find another issue to financial distress (for more details, see paragraph B.) 23 The reform of bankruptcy law in 1994 removed this absolute priority order in the sense that before 1994, creditors protected by article 40 were paid down before the secured creditors in all bankruptcy cases. The French legislator wanted, with the reform of 1994, to improve secured creditor's rights.
creditors' pursuits in order to facilitate reorganization because firm's assets, which may be collateralised, are essential to continuation. During this period of observation (which starts when the court orders the stay on creditors' claims, for a maximal length of six months), several measures are engaged. All creditors which offer new credit (called new money) have priority over the previous creditors, except when the firm is liquidated (see above). The debtor may either stay in place under the authority of the bankruptcy judge, or be replaced. An official, appointed by the court, formulates a reorganization plan (causes of default, measures to engage, schedule of repayment of creditors) which is evaluated by the judge ("plan de continuation"). After an examination of the interest of various parties, the bankruptcy judge specifies whether the company should be reorganized according to the continuation plan elaborated by the outside official, or whether assets should be sold to a third party ("plan de cession"). In the second case, the contracts, which are essential for the continuation of the firm as a going concern, are also transferred. For instance, the buyer can obtain the collateralised assets free of their obligations, if he totally cancels the debt associated with the assets. Finally, in the event of continuation, the superpriority status of the last unpaid salaries also applies. These debts rank above all others ordered in the following manner: article 40 debts, privileged debts (other salaries, tax authorities, and bankruptcy costs), secured debts, and junior claims.
C. The specificities of French bankruptcy law
If we compare French bankruptcy procedure to other European legislations and U.S. one, we note the following main differences 24 , which make the French code very interesting to study regarding the economics of financial distress. First, French bankruptcy law explicitly specifies the objectives of the collective process: maintaining the firm's operations in order to preserve employment ranks first, before the recovery of liabilities. Second, the commercial court has a real enforcement power during the collective process: the bankruptcy judge decides the adoption of the reorganization plan (there is no voting procedure or veto power for stakeholders), and requires an automatic stay on creditors' claims as soon as the firm starts the observation period. Third, it seems unlikely that firms, engaged in the liquidation procedure, may continue their operations because all going concern asset sales are regulated in a specific process ("plan de cession"). Fourth, creditors which offer new credit once the firm filed for bankruptcy receive post filing priority (these loans are referred to as article 40 debts). Finally, the court can examine all pre-default contracts which seem to be suspect in the sense that they would have voluntary caused a reduction of firm's value prior the filing for bankruptcy (this examination covers the socalled "suspect period").
IV. THE DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

A. Data source
We built a large database of French corporate bankruptcy filings performed on the period 1995-2005. We identified two sub samples in order to take into account the 1994 bankruptcy law reform: 716 filings under the 1985 bankruptcy law and 288 filings under the 1994 bankruptcy law. Precisely, we manually collected information from several documents: the bankruptcy declaration form, the Court's decision and motivations, the list of claims, and the financialeconomic administrator's report on the bankrupt firm 25 . Then, the data were gathered inside a specific template whose general form is described in annex 2. We chose to concentrate our analysis only on Parisian Courts because of the availability, the quality of data, and especially, the greater capacity of these Courts to develop prevention through out-of-court settlements: indeed, since the 1994 bankruptcy law reform, the Parisian courts settled prevention units (called "cellules de prevention-détection") which aimed at auditing the firm's managers when the Courts receive primer signals of economic / financial difficulties. To evaluate this selection bias, we verified that the characteristics of our sample do not significantly differ from national figures in several ways. First, percentages of various issues to financial distress do not differ from national average ones (liquidations are more than 90% on average). Second, both the sectors in which bankruptcy firms perform and the bankruptcy rates in our sample are also quite similar to the national figures. Only Paris shows slightly higher frequencies of limited responsibility firms.
The first step in forming the database was to exclude agricultural and financial firms which depend on a specific bankruptcy code, and to keep only closed bankruptcy affairs (indeed, only closed procedures allow us to compute final creditors' recovery rates). This reduced the sample to 858 bankrupt firms (596 before 1994, 262 after 1994) . We chose also to increase the proportion of continuations (i.e. reorganizations and sales) up to 40% of all procedures in order to obtain a more balanced database compared to the national statistics which exhibit a deep imbalance between continuations and liquidations 26 .
Further, among continuations, we used the SIRENE database of INSEE (French National Institute of Statistics) to identify firms whose reorganization failed and thus ended up in liquidation: our recovery rates take into account the probability of success of reorganization plans 27 . As these plans last for several years (7 years on average), we used the risk-free interest rate of Treasury to discount the recovery amounts at the time of the Court's decision. Finally, it has to be stressed that, in France, some peculiar claims can be repaid out of the collective procedure: this restricts to the providers of goods / merchandises, provided their contractual relations with the firm explicitly mention such a protection 28 .
Under these specifications, we gathered, for each bankruptcy filing, data about the firms' economic and financial difficulties, the causes of default (51 codes, see annex 2), the measures engaged by the Courts (33 codes, see annex 2), the outcome of financial distress (we discriminate between reorganization, sale as a going concern, immediate liquidation and liquidation taking place after an observation period), the characteristics of the buyout proposals (sales), and the recovered amounts for each class of claimants according to the legal priority rule of claimants depicted in section III (for details see annex 1).
B. Summary statistics, terminology and sample structure
The sample firms cover a large cross section of sectors (from 12% to 23% in commercial sector, 23% to 34% in industry, and 44% to 55% for services 29 ) and a great majority of firms with limited responsibility (this last feature is observable at the national level too). In order to estimate both (1) the amount of the liquid assets' shortage and (2) the comparison between the market value of assets and the face value of due claims, we used two complementary variables: (1) the variable "assets minus claims" measures the market estimated value of total liquid assets minus the total due verified claims; (2) the variable "coverage rate" is the ratio of the market value of all assets -estimated at the date of triggering -out of the total of all due verified claims. The length of the procedure gives the number of months which separate the triggering of the bankruptcy procedure and the Court's final decision 30 . Finally, as we did not collect any direct information on the level of bankruptcy costs, we estimated them from the legal remunerations of bankruptcy practitioners defined by the French regulation n°85-1390 (Law 27/12/1985) which precisely links these remunerations to the firm's size and the outcome of bankruptcy process 31 . In table 1, the legal outcomes (reorganizations, sales, liquidations) are then compared to better identify bankrupt firms in each issue. Table 1 provides the results of ANOVA tests: averages significantly differ from an issue to another at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels when the Fisher statistic is associated to ***,**, and *, respectively.
If we compare the two samples (before and after the 1994 reform), we note a significant growth of the length of procedures and bankruptcy costs whereas commercial Courts increase their efforts of prevention during the same period: it may result from the firms' size effect (proxied by the number of employees). Besides, reorganizations take much time and generate higher bankruptcy costs. At the opposite, firms which are immediately liquidated, present the lowest values for turnovers and coverage rates, which is not surprising. Moreover, the most performing bankrupt firms, according to their coverage rates, are continued through reorganizations whereas sales as a going concern concentrate on the biggest firms (turnover and number of employees), probably due to a reputation effect. Finally, observations in table 1 suggest that decision making in commercial court is largely influenced by economic and financial ratios of bankrupt firms (see Fisher statistics for ANOVA tests). During the second period, we note also a significant reduction of gaps between the coverage rates for each outcome of the bankruptcy process. We interpret this change as an effect of the increase of prevention engaged by commercial courts: after 1994, the importance of financial distress is more uniform between firms, when entering the procedure.
V. HOW SOCIAL EFFICIENCY INFLUENCES FRENCH COMMERCIAL COURTS DURING THE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS?
In this part, our main hypothesis is that French commercial courts are biased in favour of the issues which are better suited with maintaining activity in order to preserve employment. To account for the legislator's objective 32 , we study how this French legal particularity affects either the probability of reorganization or the probability of sale as a going concern in comparison to the firm's liquidation. In a first time, we determine (1) which variables drive the bankruptcy courts' decisions about the three issues of default: reorganization, sale as a going concern, and liquidation, and (2) the constraints under which French commercial courts operate when they determine the legal outcome of bankruptcy. In a second time, since there may exist several propositions in case of sales as a going concern, we explore also the court's criteria employed to select the winning offer. Anew, we expect that commercial courts are primarily influenced by social norms such as employment protection.
A. The choice between continuation and liquidation
We estimate a multinomial logit regression on two samples of firms which were bankrupt under either legislation 25/01/1985 (557 companies) or legislation 10/06/1994 (267 companies). The dependent variable is the probability that a firm, following the court's decision, falls into a reorganization procedure, is sold as a going concern, or is liquidated.
To describe the court's decision under constraint 33 , we use a first set of ex ante variables, in the sense they constrain the courts' choice between continuation and liquidation. This set covers data on the causes of default (see annex 2.), the characteristics of the bankrupt firm, and the levels 34 of 32 Recall that the first article of French bankruptcy law enacted since 1985 orders objectives of the collective process: safeguarding the business, maintaining firm's activity and employment, and, finally, discharging liabilities. 33 For instance, the probability of sale as a going concern strongly depends on both the demand side constraint (the existence of a potential buyer for firm's assets) and the offer side constraint (the present value of its assets). 34 It is more likely Courts take into account the levels of the different claims rather than their relative structure.
various debts. We explore also a second set of ex post variables, in the sense they depict the courts' activity after bankruptcy is triggered off. These variables cover the various measures the courts may undertake or allow during the procedure: more precisely, we distinguish between "connected measures" and those who are not (see annex 2.). The first ones serve as a proxy of the courts' efforts to engage measures promoting continuation, and which are connected with the declared causes of default: for instance, the legal administrator has engaged measures related to outlets, while the origin of default was -partially or not -due to a deduction of outlets. Analysing the number of these both sets of measures -and not their types -, we reduce the risk of endogeneity between the causes of default and the engaged measures: in annex 3, we test the risk of endogeneity between explanatory variables: in almost all cases 35 , endogeneity is rejected. Besides, we isolate a third kind of measures called legal measures: they are specific to the French bankruptcy code and are related to the ability of Courts to force the continuation of firm's contracts (for instance, electricity, furniture…). Furthermore, we spot the financial capacity of the firm to continue its operations through the coverage rate (i.e. the economic value of assets out of the debts) 36 . The log of the number of employees provides a measure of the main factor we test: the capacity and the objective of courts to maintain employment (notice employees are, on one hand, an ex ante constraint and, on the other hand, a variable that may affect the courts' ex post decision). We also include, as control variables, the sector in which bankrupt firms perform, their legal form, and age. Finally, we compare various types of debts according to their level of legal protection: the absolute priority rule distinguishes between claims with a super-priority status (recent unpaid wages, from less than two months), claims with a general privilege status (employees, tax authorities and bankruptcy costs), claims with a special privilege status (secured claims with collateral), and junior claims. A natural question is how the structure of bankrupt firm's liabilities has an impact on the issue ordered by the commercial court. Table 2 presents the results of the model using multivariate regression analysis. We report the coefficients for the reorganization and the sale as a going concern relative to the liquidation. As explained below, our hypothesis of the influence of the first article of bankruptcy law on courts' decision is supported by the data. As predicted, controlling for firm-level characteristics, commercial courts work to promote continuation in order to maintain employment (i.e. to increase social efficiency). Indeed, the number of both connected and unconnected measureswhich serve as a proxy of restructuring efforts of commercial courts to promote continuationhave a large positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of continuation in comparison to the probability of liquidation 37 . Moreover, we note that the level of unsecured claims significantly increases the probability of both bankruptcy procedures which serve continuation. As the level of unsecured claims a priori positively correlate with the risk of domino effects, this last finding suggests that the continuation of bankrupt firms has a positive impact on the reduction of domino effects. Here, we may only suggest (but do not prove) that French bankruptcy Courts, which are intended to preserve employment through firms' continuation, explicitly seek also to decrease the occurrence of domino effects. 35 Only "connected measures" can be considered as endogenous at the level of 5% on the first sample only (i.e. 1985 Law) . This suggests the results obtained for this variable on the first sample should be considered with caution. 36 Annex 3 tests the risk of endogeneity for the coverage rate: endogeneity is rejected on both samples. 37 The causes of financial distress (and the sector in which the firm performs) help little in explaining the court's decision. This reflects the low difference between bankrupt firms apart from their level of debt outstanding and their coverage rate. NOTE. -The table reports results of logit regression analysis of the determinants of the type of continuation (either under reorganization or sale as a going concern) upon the eventual decision to liquidate the firm piecemeal. We separate financially distressed firms which filed for bankruptcy before 1994 (legislation of 01/25/1985) and those which filed after 1994 (legislation of 06/10/1994). In both samples, the dependent variables are the probabilities of sale and of reorganization relative to the probability of liquidation. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,**, and *, respectively.
However, the economic and financial ex ante constraints play also a crucial role in the Court's decision making during the bankruptcy process. In other words, even if the efforts of commercial Courts in favour of continuations have an impact on the outcome of bankruptcy, some other factors may pre-determine the issue of financial distress. Indeed, the probability of sale as a going concern strongly depends on the offer side constraint as this probability is positively and very significantly associated with the scale of the firm evaluated by the number of employees. Further, the continuation, via either reorganization or sale, statistically depends on main bankrupt firm's characteristics: economic value of assets relative to its debts (see coverage rate), age, or capacity to pay wages (see level of claims with a super-priority status). But, bankruptcy law may also have an impact on these constraints through the efforts of prevention. This explains why, before the legal reform in 1994, only internal causes (outlets, production) affect the probability of reorganization and/or sale whereas, for continuations taking place after 1994, only external causes (accident, external environment) positively affect the probability of reorganization. Second, the fact that continuation after 1994 is not determined anymore by the level of coverage rate means that earlier resolution of financial distresses, due to the efforts of prevention, strengthens the value of bankrupt firms, especially those which end up in liquidation. Third, as we interpret the declaration of a suspect period as a mean to recover some value, exclusively reserved for the least performing bankrupt firms, the significant negative impact of the dummy variable on both probabilities of continuation, for default before 1994, give anew some evidence that bankrupt firms are relatively less financially distressed under the 1994 law 38 .
To sum up, we obtain strong indications that French commercial courts actively seek to promote continuation during the bankruptcy process. Yet, this action is subject to severe external constraints that the development of prevention, initiated by the legal reform of 1994, has allowed to reduce.
B. The choice between rival sales as a going concern
If commercial courts follow the implicit hierarchy established by the first article of French legislation, we should observe they promote sale propositions which are more likely to maintain employment. To capture this effect, our analysis focuses on the sales which involved two or more rival buyout proposals (respectively 169 and 123 proposals for the 25/01/1985 and 10/06/1994 samples). The explained variable is the probability for a plan to be chosen by the court. The explicative variables are the plan's characteristics (either accepted or refused), as reported by the administrator 39 . Several indexes were built in order to standardize these characteristics. The first one is the proposed price (out of debts), as a basis for future financial efficiency: if this is taken into account by the courts, the price should positively influence their choice. The second set of variables deals with the offer's qualities, as they determine the future of both the bankrupt firm and its employees with a new owner (the offer "preserves employment", the buyer is "financially strong", "experienced", or "reputed"): of course, the preservation of employment is of primer interest because it may 40 improve social efficiency. We use a third set of indicators for the motivation of the offer as developed in industrial organization (the expected synergy, the absorption of a competitor, the diversification of business, or the increase of reputation). Following the McFadden (1974) approach, we run a conditional logit regression to model the courts' choice between proposals competing each-others. The probability equals one if it is accepted by the court, and zero if refused. Table 3 presents the regression results. 38 We evaluate the financial efficiency of the declaration of a suspect period in section V. 39 The administrator's report (the "bilan économique et social") it is transferred to the Court, for definitive decision. 40 Notice this is a commitment announced by the buyer. He may not respect his commitments in the future (especially the social ones). Nevertheless, such behaviour is subject to sanctions, especially since the 1994 reform. NOTE. -The table reports results of conditional logit regression of rival offers when the firm was sold as a going concern. The dependent variable equals 1 if the judge accepts the offer and 0 if he rejects it. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,**, and *, respectively.
As predicted, the fact an offer is likely to preserve employment has a determinant impact on the court's decision when several rival buyout plans are competing to restructure bankrupt firms. All other variables are rarely statistically significant and differ between the two samples according to the studied period. We do not conclude that the proposed sale price has no effect on bankruptcy courts: we suggest that commercial courts consider each bankruptcy independently and will select the proposition that will save employment at the best price. To be more precise, we evaluate the impact of sales as a going concern on creditors' recovery rates in the next section.
VI. THE "PRICE" OF SOCIAL EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL RECOVERY RATES
The relation between the various issues of French bankruptcy procedures depicted in section V and the global recovery rate is of prime interest because it links the work of commercial courts constrained by the first article of the French code (promoting the protection of activity and employment), with the potential costs/consequences (the "price") of this policy through the recovery rate of all claimants 41 . At the same time, this variable serves as a proxy to evaluate ex post financial efficiency of the bankruptcy process: if global recovery rate is sufficiently higher when firms continue to operate through reorganization or sale as a going concern (relative to liquidation), we may attempt to conclude that commercial courts do not (or very few) commit type 1 errors 42 . It would contrast with the common view that debtor friendly systems fail to eliminate bankrupt firms which are economically inefficient. 41 We consider that bankruptcy courts maximise the joint welfare of various stakeholders. 42 Type 1 errors occur when some economically inefficient failing firms mistakenly are categorized as efficient and allowed to reorganize.
To challenge the question of the "price" of social efficiency, we propose two complementary approaches. First, we compute ANOVA tests on the averages of recovery rates per issue (immediate liquidation, liquidation after an observation period, reorganizations, and sales as a going concern) in order (1) to compare the different levels of recovery rates (averages) between issues, and (2) to test if these averages significantly differ from one issue to another. If the averages of recovery rates appear to be relatively lower (respectively higher) for continuations than for liquidations, we can infer the protection of social efficiency -through a preference for continuations -has a cost (resp. gain) in terms of ex post financial efficiency. Second, for each extreme issue (either continuation of liquidation 43 ), we use a double censored tobit model to regress the global recovery rate (defined on the [0,1] interval) on a set of variables depicting (1) the way default has been managed (before and after bankruptcy), (2) the firm's characteristics, and (3) the importance of financial distress. While doing this, we are able to isolate variables affecting the global recovery rate (i.e. ex post financial efficiency) for each possible outcome (i.e. either liquidation or continuation). This model serves us to identify, once social efficiency is preserved through continuation, which variables may raise or reduce ex post financial efficiency inside continuation. We address then the same question for liquidation cases.
A. The comparison of financial efficiency between the rival bankruptcy' issues
To evaluate the financial efficiency of the French bankruptcy process, we report in table 4 both the structure of claims and the recovery rates for each class of creditors.
Focusing on the different classes of creditors, it appears the higher the level of unsecured liabilities is, the smaller the global recovery rate is. It seems quite natural because junior claimants have the smaller recovery rates in comparison to other stakeholders due to their ranking under the French absolute priority rule. But, we may also suggest that these losses (i.e. low recovery rates) are the cost induced by the reduction of bankruptcy domino effects depicted in the previous section. Last, new money (i.e. claims arising after the bankruptcy triggering) plays a specific role too: new creditors recover as much as, or more than the average. This has been the basis for severe criticisms against the French law: especially, bankers interpreted this highest priority of new money over anterior secured creditors as a threat for collateralization. This is why the legislator modified the law, in 1994, giving higher priority to long term securitized claims over new money (in case of liquidation). According to us, nevertheless, this debate is of minor importance, because new money is marginal, when reported on the total of claims (from 0% up to 5.6%): as a matter of fact, most post default payments are paid cash.
Here, the crucial question is whether the protection of social efficiency involves a loss of financial efficiency. This is likely to happen provided recovery rates are significantly lower for continuations, when compared to liquidations. From that perspective, the observable differences between global recovery rates in reorganization and liquidation cases (between 66% and 74% for continuations, and between 12% and 26% for liquidations 44 ) prove that bankruptcy courts accurately classify firms as economically efficient versus inefficient when they approve continuation through reorganization. Thus, we do not find some empirical evidence of a trade-off between social efficiency and financial efficiency: on the contrary, the best way to continue the firm's operations (i.e. reorganization) exhibits also the largest average recovery rate. In contrast, the difference in recovery rates in reorganizations versus sales as a going concern is large enough (nearly 50 points) to conclude that continuation through sales achieves a relative lower level of ex post financial efficiency, but not worse than for liquidations. NOTE. -The first table gives the structure of various claims. Creditors are ordered according to their level of priority: (1) claims with a super priority status, (2) post filing priority claims, (3) claims with a privilege status, (4) secured claims, (5) junior claims. The second table provides the recovery rates of different classes of creditors for the four issues of bankruptcy: sale, reorganization, liquidation (immediate or after a period of observation). Recovery rates are in percentage of the claims. In both tables, ANOVA tests are given: averages significantly differ from an issue to another at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels when the Fisher statistic is associated to ***,**, and *, respectively. Table 5 provides the results of a double censored tobit regression of the post default global recovery rate (privileged, secured, and junior) for liquidations (immediate or not) and for continuations (sales and reorganization plans). A tobit model is appropriate as the estimated recovery rate is between zero and one: annex 4 gives the density functions of the liquidations' and continuations' recovery rates for both samples. By construction, the tobit approach is subject to heteroscedasticity, as the variance of errors is a function of explanatory variables: thus, the promote out-of-court negotiation (such as "règlement amiable"), recovery rates in reorganization and liquidation are much higher. However, for sales as a going concern, we find the opposite effect. hypothesis of multiplicative heteroscedasticity 45 was tested for every model, and was accepted (at the 1% level) in almost all cases (excepted for the model on continuations under the 1994's legislation). Notice that we only include the "coverage rate" (i.e. the economic value of assets out of debts) as a source of heteroscedasticity: indeed, this one is expected to increase with the number of censored observations. So, modelling heteroscedasticity, we restrain the analysis to the subset of variables that may lead the recovery rate to extreme values (i.e. 0 or 1). This is the case of the coverage rate, whose level is the starting point of all future recoveries (i.e. a lowrespectively high -coverage rate is likely to bring about a null -resp. 100% -global recovery rate). The density functions of residuals for the four regressions are given in annex 5. NOTE. - Table 5 reports results of a double censored tobit regression of the global recovery rate for either liquidation or continuation (reorganization and sale as going concern). The endogenous variable takes value between zero and one (see annex 4). We use similar explanatory variables than in the first regression analysis. We add a measure of the percentage of junior claims relative to the sum of all claims (Unsecured claims/Total claims). The variance of errors is an output of the tobit approach (linked to the expression of conditional moments). Table 4 provides also the results of the tests for heteroscedasticity: in one case only, homoscedasticity was accepted. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,**, and *, respectively.
B. The factors of financial efficiency for each possible bankruptcy' issue
45 About the heteroscedastic model, the test is of the following form:
, where The firm specific explanatory variables remain nearly the same as for the first regression analysis: explanatory variables are (1) the origin default and the way it was managed, (2) the firm's characteristics, and (3) the importance of financial distress. We analyse their effect on the global recovery rate, issue per issue. Here, our analysis is contingent to the bankruptcy's issue: continuation, then liquidation.
Continuation (through sales or reorganization plans) is the privileged issue, from the French bankruptcy law perspective, because it is considered as the best way to ensure social efficiency. Then, the question is: once social efficiency is likely to arise through continuation, to which extent can the court increase ex-post financial efficiency? The analysis of some explanatory variables helps in answering this question. For continuations taking place under the 1985 legislation, several causes (outlets, strategy, finance, and management) negatively affect the global recovery rate, which is not true anymore for continuations under the 1994 legislation (only accidents significantly increase the recovered amounts). The interpretation is straightforward and is directly linked to the development of prevention after 1994: before this date, the courts were facing lots of delayed defaults, so that ex-post efficiency (proxied by the global recovery rate) was mostly pre-determined by ex-ante factors, anterior to any legal post-intervention. The increasing role of prevention after 1994 has changed this, so that -on average -ex-post efficiency is not affected by external ex-ante factors anymore 46 . In section V, the measures undertaken under the courts' supervision were positively correlated with the issue of continuations: this provided clues that French Courts actively prepare continuations over liquidations, and, by doing this, promote social efficiency. Additionally here, it appears, inside these continuations, some measures (the "connected" ones) are undertaken by the Courts, so that the global recovery rate is increased too. This result is of primer importance, because it does not exactly confirm a pure trade-off between social and financial efficiencies, but, rather a hierarchy of objectives: once some measures have made continuation a promising issue, the court allows / facilitate measures raising the creditors' recovered amounts. Yet, this does not mean there is no trade-off at all: indeed, focusing on the impact of the number of employees on the recovery rate (which is significant and negative after the 1994 reform), the continuation seems to be less financially efficient when it applies to firms with higher employment stakes 47 . To sum-up, for continuations, the trade-off between social and financial efficiency is partially confirmed, when looking at big firms; but it does not mean that courts are unable to increase expost financial every time they can: on the contrary, the observation period provides also the opportunity to undertake measures aimed at increasing the global recovery rate.
According to the French bankruptcy view, liquidations should be the default output of the bankruptcy, when social efficiency cannot be reached by other means. Then, the question is: once liquidation appears to be unavoidable, can the Courts promote at least financial efficiency? The answer depends on the context, as shows the comparison between 1985 liquidations and post-1994 liquidations. Because of the lack of prevention, under the 1985 law, the bulk of liquidations deal with firms with nearly null assets, so that liquidation is more a statement than a choice. Here, we consider also that courts can only declare a "suspect period" in order to recover some previously sold assets or cancel doubtful contracts, if any. But, finally, this strategy does not increase the proceeds to share between claimants: on the contrary, the dummy variable "suspect period" has a significant negative impact on the global recovery rate (from the same perspective, the number of employees positively affects the global recovery rate for the 1985-law sample: this only reflects the case of firms with numerous employees and significant levels of assets, leading to higher recovery rates). To sum-up, for liquidations, whatever the period (post or prior 1994), commercial courts have no significant ways of improving financial efficiency: the firms' situation, at the moment of their bankruptcy filing, pre-determines the outcome. Further, under the 1985 law, the suspect period has a significant and negative impact on global recovery rates. Since the 1994 reform, the variables increasing the global recovery rate under liquidation are also out of the court's area of action: i.e. the causes of default (production and management difficulties), the legal form (limited responsibility), and the firms' age.
Focusing on all issues, there does not appear a significant area for the courts to improve financial efficiency during the bankruptcy process, except for continuations, where some "connected measures" (as defined above) significantly improve the global recovery rate.
However, as shown in subsection VI.A, the large increase of various claimants' recovery rates since 1994 highlights the impact of prevention on both ex ante social and financial efficiencies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Among developed countries, the main goals of bankruptcy law are to restructure, or close down if restructuring is impossible, and to provide claimants (the tax authorities, employees, secured and unsecured creditors) with an absolute priority rule for debt recovery. However, in practice, many differences concerning both the rules that govern bankrupt firms and the objectives of national bankruptcy codes exist. In this area of comparative law, several conclusions of the study presented above reveal that French bankruptcy Courts actively protect employment at the time of the choice 1) between reorganization, sale as a going concern or liquidation, and 2) between rival offers for a sale as a going concern of bankrupt firms. More precisely, the strong correlation between the probability of continuation and both legal measures engaged and the level of unsecured debt of bankrupt firms prove that commercial courts seek to protect employment by promoting continuation and reducing domino effects of bankruptcy. Furthermore, the implicit rules that govern the court's choice between rival offers for the sale of bankrupt firms confirm that social considerations have an impact on the decisions of bankruptcy courts. The other obvious implication of this research is the determination of the financial cost of this bias. We note that reorganizations generate the highest recovery rates for all classes of creditors: the fact that bankruptcy courts seek to preserve employment through continuation of bankrupt firms does not imply a severe cost for other stakeholders. Moreover, contrary to the expected trade-off between social and financial considerations, we note that Courts engage also measures to increase debt recoveries once continuation tends to be the selected issue. However, for sales as a going concern, recovery rates are inhibited by asset illiquidity or by the Court's attempt to promote firm's continuation (and also employment saving) through sales at a low price. (1) Agriculture, and financial services excluded. Table A2 provides the general structure of our templates. It collects 230 variables gathered in 7 different groups: group 1 identifies the bankrupt company / group of companies. Group 2 gathers variables describing the bankruptcy process and the origin of default. Group 3a identifies the type of procedure -from triggering to final outcome. Group 3b gives financial information on assets and liabilities by type of claim. Group 3c codifies the measures engaged by the Court during the observation period. Group 3d deals with the recovered amounts and the characteristics of buyout proposals (if any). Group 3e gives elements about legal sanctions against the managers (if any). 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 % Table A3 provides the codifications we used for the causes of default and the engaged measures. All of them are gathered into 8 groups: outlets, strategy, production, finance, management, accident, and external environment. Table A4 provides the repartition of the causes of default, per issue, and the results of ANOVA tests: averages significantly differ from an issue to another at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels when the Fisher statistic is associated to ***,**, and *, respectively. 
Annex 3: Endogeneity tests
The corporate bankruptcy process, as captured in our templates, can be summarized as follows: our ex-ante variables (i.e. cause of default, size, coverage rate…) can be viewed as the bankruptcy's inputs (at the date of triggering). Our post-default variables (i.e. the measures engaged by the court) are viewed as a part of the bankruptcy process. Then, this process leads to a financial output, proxied here by the global recovery rate. Indeed, we test the presence of any endogeneity bias between these two sets of variables, and the addressed question becomes: regarding the obtained recovery rate, are our post-default variables statistically explained by our ex-ante variables (endogeneity), or not (exogenity)? Note the answer is not straightforward because the measures are not classified by function as for the causes (finance, management, production…), but by nature (connected or not with the causes, as explained above). We shall see this peculiar definition of measures reduces the risk of endogeneity.
We use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman procedure dedicated to endogeneity testing: we model the global recovery rate as a function of both ex-ante and ex-post variables, as depicted above. In that view, our ex ante variables (cause of default, size, coverage rate…) are assumed to be exogenous, and serve as instruments. The DWH test is a two-steps procedure: first, an OLS estimation is performed on variables "connected measure" (see table A5 ) and "unconnected measure" (see table A6 ), using all ex-ante variables as explanatory variables (the complete list of these variables is depicted in each table, "step 1"). Second, we store the residuals obtained in step 1 and insert them -as another explanatory variable -in the OLS estimation of the global recovery rate (step 2). Then, the value of the |t| of Student is used to test for any endogeneity bias.
It appears that, endogeneity is always rejected, with the exception of "connected measures" on the first sample (legislation of 25/01/1985). Yet, for this variable, endogeneity cannot be accepted at the 1% level. Step 2 : SLS on ln(recovered amounts)
Test for endogenity bias : 2 steps Durbin-Wu-Hausman procedure
Step 1 : SLS regression on the nb. of unconnected measures Explicative variables: nb. causes of defaut (outlets); nb. causes of defaut (strategy); nb. causes of defaut (production); nb. causes of defaut (finance); nb. causes of defaut (management); nb. causes of defaut (accident); nb. causes defaut (external environment) ; legal form (limited responsibility); sector (commercial); sector (services); ln(firm's age); ln(employees); ln(debts: "superprivilège"); ln(debts: collaterals); ln(debts: State & employees); ln(debts: unsecured claims). 
